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ABRIDGED CV, with links to selected articles highlighted:
Sage School of Philosophy
218 Goldwin Smith Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-3201
Office: 323 Goldwin Smith Hall
Telephone: (607) 255-6825
E-mail address: email@example.com
B.A., 1978: Calvin College
M.A., 1979: University of California, Los Angeles, Philosophy
Ph.D., 1985: University of California, Los Angeles, Philosophy
Assistant Professor, University of Vermont, 1985-91
Associate Professor, University of Vermont, 1991-97
Professor, University of Vermont, 1997-2007
Professor, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 2007-
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:
Free will and moral responsibility
Philosophy of mind
17th and 18th century philosophy, especially Kant
Philosophy of religion
Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Précis, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2013): 715-27
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Four Views on Free Will, co-authored with Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, and Manual Vargas, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007.
Reprinted as Cuatro Perspectivos sobre Libertad, translated into Spanish by Inés Echavarría, Gabriela Polit, and Ricardo Restrepo, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2013.
Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction, co-authored with Michael McKenna, London: Routledge, 2016.
Existentialism: Basic Writings, co-edited with Charles Guignon, an anthology, with introductions, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995; second (expanded) edition, 2001.
Free Will, an anthology, with introduction, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, first edition, 1997; second (expanded) edition, 2009.
The Rationalists, an anthology, with introduction, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes, and Free Will, co-edited with Maureen Sie, an anthology, with introduction, London: Routledge, 2015.
"Kant on Intentionality," Synthèse 77, 1988, pp. 321-52.
"Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy," Synthèse 85, 1990, pp. 25-54.
Here I contend that the justificatory procedure of transcendental philosophy is not classically rationalist, since it appeals to really possible as opposed to logically possible experience, and appeals to really possible experience are to be adjudicated empirically, albeit in this case in a minimal sense.
"Mathematical Expressibility, Perceptual Relativity, and Secondary Qualities," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22, 1991, pp. 63-88.
"Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist," Synthèse 88, 1991, pp. 341-358.
“Kant’s Amphiboly,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 73, 1991, pp. 50-70.
"Is Kant's Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent?" History of Philosophy Quarterly 8, 1991, pp. 357-72. Penultimate draft.
In this article I argue that Kant's claims concerning transcendental knowledge of the self's construction of experience are consistent with the limitations he sets on knowledge of things in themselves if those limitations are conceived as a denial of knowledge of the intrinsic natures of those things, which is to be understood as including knowledge of their fundamenal causal powers. This leaves belief in God and freedom as matters of faith and not knowledge, since these beliefs concern fundamental causal powers of intrinsic natures.
with Hilary Kornblith, "The Metaphysics of Irreducibility," Philosophical Studies 63, 1991, pp. 125-45.
Here Hilary Kornblith and I propose and defend a nonreductive physicalism that denies both type and token identity of mental and physical states and that preserves mental causation.
"Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994, pp. 315-29.
In this article I set out a physicalist response to the knowledge argument that invokes the idea that our introspective representation of phenomenal properties is inaccurate in the sense that it represents them as having features that they actually lack.
"Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza," Faith and Philosophy 11, 1994, pp. 592-625.
"Determinism Al Dente," Noûs 29, 1995, pp. 21-45.
Here I set out and argue for the position that we lack the sort of free will at issue in the traditional debate, but that we can live with the resulting conception. I later develop this position in detail in Living without Free Will (Cambridge 2001), and in Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (Oxford 2014).
"Self-Understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction," Synthèse 103, 1995, pp. 1-42.
"Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content," Philosophical Perspectives 9, 1995, pp. 401-26.
"Kant on God, Evil, and Teleology," Faith and Philosophy 13, 1996, pp. 508-33.
"Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories," Philosophical Perspectives 14, 2000, pp. 119-37.
In this article I propose and defend a buffer-style Frankfurt case, which I call 'Tax Evasion.'
"Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities," in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, M. McKenna and D. Widerker, eds., Ashgate, 2003, pp. 185-99.
"The Problem of Evil," in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, William E. Mann, ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 148-70.
A critical survey of a half-century of work on the problem of evil for theism.
"Is Our Conception of Agent Causation Coherent?" Philosophical Topics 32, 2004, pp. 275-86.
"Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence," in God and the Ethics of Belief, A. Chignell and A. Dole, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 77-98.
"Defending Hard Incompatibilism," Midwest Studies 29, 2005, pp. 228-47.
"Reasons Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism; Reflections on J. Fischer’s My Way," Philosophical Books 47, 2006, pp. 198-212.
"Kant on Transcendental Freedom," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, 2006, pp. 537-67. jstor
"On Mele’s Free Will and Luck," Philosophical Explorations 10, 2007, pp. 163-72.
"A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, 2008, pp. 160-70.
"A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation,” Journal of Ethics 12, 2008, pp. 287-307.
"Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again," in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, N. Trakakis and D. Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008, pp. 1-33.
"Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy," in Appearance, Reality, and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert M. Adams, L. M. Jorgensen and S. Newlands, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 156-87.
"Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals," Philosophical Studies 144, 2009, pp. 21-33.
"Further Thoughts about a Frankfurt-Style Argument,” Philosophical Explorations 12, 2009, pp. 109-18.
"Free Will, Love and Anger," Ideas y Valores 141, 2009, pp. 5-25.
"Kant’s Transcendental Arguments," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/, 2009, revised 2013.
"Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism, and Objectivity," Philosophic Exchange 40, 2009-10, pp. 45-59.
with Andrew Chignell, "Kant’s Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth Century German Background," review essay on Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background and Source Materials, Philosophical Review 119, 2010, pp. 565-91.
"Early Modern Philosophical Theology," (revised version), in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, second edition, P. Quinn, P. Draper and C, Taliaferro, eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 2010, pp. 114-23.
"Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life," in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane, ed., second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 407-24.
"Theological Determinism and Divine Providence," in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Ken Perszyk, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 261-79.
"Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection," Philosophical Issues 22 (2012), pp. 298-315.
"The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event-Causal Libertarianism," Philosophical Studies (2012).
"Free Will Skepticism, Blame, and Obligation," in Blame: its Nature and Norms, Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 189-206.
“Omissions and Different Senses of Responsibility,” in Agency and Moral Responsibility, Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya, and Sergi Rosell, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016, pp. 179-91.
“Theological Determinism and the Relationship with God,” in Free Will and Classical Theism, Hugh J. McCann, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 201-19.
of Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, Ethics 111, 2000, p. 426.
of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 2007, pp. 269-72.
of John Martin Fischer, My Way, Ethics 117, 2007, pp. 754-57.
of William Rowe, Can God Be Free?, Philosophical Review 118, 2009, pp. 121-22.
of Ishtiyaque Haji, Reason’s Debt to Freedom, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, March 2013.
of Steven Horst, Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Metascience, March 2014 (link to penultimate draft), DOI: 10.1007/s11016-014-9877-8 (link to Metascience).
with Leigh Vicens, of Kevin Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, April 2015.
To the Susan Linn Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University:
Standing Committee for Faculty Recruitment, 2007- ; Chair 2007-13
Search Committee (co-chair), 2007-08
Editor, Philosophical Review, Spring 2008
Acting Chair, Sage School of Philosophy, 2008-09
Graduate Student Admissions Committee, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11
Editor-in-Chief, Philosophical Review, Spring 2010
Director of Graduate Studies, 2010-11
Director of Undergraduate Studies, Fall 2011
Editor, Philosophical Review, 2012-13
Stanford H. Taylor '50 Chair, Sage School of Philosophy, 2013-