Direct links to works in blue; links via a wall in gold.
Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Four Views on Free Will, co-authored with Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, and Manual Vargas, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007.
Reprinted as Cuatro Perspectivos sobre Libertad, translated into Spanish by Inés Echavarría, Gabriela Polit, and Ricardo Restrepo, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2013.
Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction, co-authored with Michael McKenna, London: Routledge, 2016.
Existentialism: Basic Writings, co-edited with Charles Guignon, an anthology, with introductions, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995; second (expanded) edition, 2001.
Free Will, an anthology, with introduction, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, first edition, 1997; second (expanded) edition, 2009.
The Rationalists, an anthology, with introduction, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes, and Free Will, co-edited with Maureen Sie, an anthology, with introduction, London: Routledge, 2015.
“Kant on Intentionality,” Synthèse 77, 1988, pp. 321-52.
“Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy,” Synthèse 85, 1990, pp. 25-54.
“Mathematical Expressibility, Perceptual Relativity, and Secondary Qualities,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22, 1991, pp. 63-88.
“Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist,” Synthèse 88, 1991, pp. 341-358.
“Kant’s Amphiboly,”Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 73, 1991, pp. 50-70.
“Is Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent?”History of Philosophy Quarterly 8, 1991, pp. 357-72.
Kant’s claims concerning transcendental knowledge of the self’s construction of experience are consistent with the limitations he sets on knowledge of things in themselves if those limitations are conceived as a denial of knowledge of the intrinsic natures of those things, which is to be understood as including knowledge of their fundamental causal powers. This leaves belief in God and freedom as matters of faith and not knowledge, since these beliefs concern fundamental causal powers of intrinsic natures.
with Hilary Kornblith, “The Metaphysics of Irreducibility,”Philosophical Studies 63, 1991, pp. 125-45.
“Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994, pp. 315-29.
I develop a physicalist response to the knowledge argument that invokes the idea that our introspective representation of phenomenal properties is inaccurate in the sense that it represents them as having features that they actually lack.
“Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza,”Faith and Philosophy 11, 1994, pp. 592-625.
“Determinism Al Dente,”Noûs 29, 1995, pp. 21-45.
I set out and argue for the position that we lack the sort of free will at issue in the traditional debate, but that we can live with the resulting conception. I later develop this position in detail in Living without Free Will (Cambridge 2001), and in Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (Oxford 2014).
“Self-Understanding in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction,”Synthèse 103, 1995, pp. 1-42.
“Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content,”Philosophical Perspectives 9, 1995, pp. 401-26.
“Kant on God, Evil, and Teleology,”Faith and Philosophy 13, 1996, pp. 508-33.
“Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories,” Philosophical Perspectives 14, 2000, pp. 119-37.
I propose and defend a buffer-style Frankfurt case, which I call ‘Tax Evasion.’
“Robust Nonreductive Materialism,” Journal of Philosophy 99, 2002, pp. 499-531.
“Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities,” in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, M. McKenna and D. Widerker, eds., Ashgate, 2003, pp. 185-99.
“The Problem of Evil,”in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, William E. Mann, ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 148-70.
A critical survey of a half-century of work on the problem of evil for theism.
“Is Our Conception of Agent Causation Coherent?”Philosophical Topics 32, 2004, pp. 275-86.
“Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence,”God and the Ethics of Belief, A. Chignell and A. Dole, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 77-98.
“Defending Hard Incompatibilism,”Midwest Studies 29, 2005, pp. 228-47.
“Reasons Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism;” Reflections on J. Fischer’s My Way,” Philosophical Books 47, 2006, pp. 198-212.
“Kant on Transcendental Freedom,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, 2006, pp. 537-67.
“On Mele’s Free Will and Luck,” Philosophical Explorations 10, 2007, pp. 163-72.
“A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, 2008, pp. 160-70.
“A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation,” Journal of Ethics 12, 2008, pp. 287-307.
“Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again,”in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, N. Trakakis and D. Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008, pp. 1-33.
“Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy,” in Appearance, Reality, and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert M. Adams, L. M. Jorgensen and S. Newlands, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 156-87.
“Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals,” Philosophical Studies 144, 2009, pp. 21-33.
“Further Thoughts about a Frankfurt-Style Argument,” Philosophical Explorations 12, 2009, pp. 109-18.
“Free Will, Love, and Anger,”Ideas y Valores 141, 2009, pp. 5-25.
“Kant’s Transcendental Arguments,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/, 2009, revised 2013.
“Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism, and Objectivity,” Philosophic Exchange 40, 2009-10, pp. 45-59.
with Andrew Chignell, “Kant’s Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth Century German Background,” review essay on Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background and Source Materials, Philosophical Review 119, 2010, pp. 565-91.
“Early Modern Philosophical Theology,” (revised version), in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, second edition, P. Quinn, P. Draper and C, Taliaferro, eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 2010, pp. 114-23.
“Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane, ed., second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 407-24.
“Theological Determinism and Divine Providence,”in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Ken Perszyk, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 261-79.
“Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection,”Philosophical Issues 22, 2012, pp. 298-315.
“Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will,”in The Philosophy of Free Will: Selected Contemporary Readings, Paul Russell and Oisin Deery, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 421-49.
An overview of my position on free will and moral responsibility.
“Free Will Skepticism, Blame, and Obligation,”in Blame: its Nature and Norms, Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 189-206.
“Free Will,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Roger Crisp, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 609-37.
“Precis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, and Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86, 2013, pp. 715-27; 753-64.
“A Defense without Free Will,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, D. Howard-Snyder and J. McBrayer, eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 441-55
“Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment,” in The Future of Punishment, Thomas Nadelhoffer, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 49-78.
“Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties,” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Uriah Kriegel, ed., London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 40-69.
“The Dialectic of Selfhood and the Significance of Free Will,” in Libertarian Free Will: Essays for Robert Kane, David Palmer, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 161-75.
“The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event-Causal Libertarianism,” Philosophical Studies 169.1, 2014, pp. 59-69.
with Gunnar Björnsson, “Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing,” in Moral Psychology, v. 4, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014.
“Replies to John Fischer and Dana Nelkin,” to their reviews of Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life,” Science, Religion, and Culture 1, 2014, pp. 218-25.
“The Material Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness,” in The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a Science and Theory, Steven Miller, ed., Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2015, pp. 418-32.
“The Phenomenology of Agency and Deterministic Agent Causation,”in Horizons of Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology: Essays in Honor of Charles Guignon, Hans Pederson and Megan Altman, eds., New York: Springer, 2015, pp. 277-94.
“Consciousness, Physicalism, and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties,”in Russellian Monism, T. Alter and Y. Nagawasa, eds., New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 300-23.
“A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to the Threat of Causal Determination,”The Nature of Moral Responsibility, Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna and Angela Smith, eds., Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 281-96.
with Andrew Chignell, “Natural Theology and Natural Religion,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2015, URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-theology
with Gunnar Björnsson,“Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will,” in The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Wesley Buckwalter and Justin Sytsma, eds., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2016, pp. 142-57.
“Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,”in Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns, Daniel Speak and Kevin Timpe, eds., 2016, New York: Oxford University Press, 112-31.
“Omissions and Different Senses of Responsibility,”in Agency and Moral Responsibility, Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya, and Sergi Rosell, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016, pp. 179-91.
“Theological Determinism and the Relationship with God,”in Free Will and Classical Theism, Hugh J. McCann, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 201-19.
“Transcendental Arguments,”in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, John Hawthorne, Herman Cappelen and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 444-62.
A survey article on transcendental argument as a philosophical methodology.
“Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness,”Journal of Consciousness Studies 23, 2016, pp. 172-85.
“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,”Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 4, David Shoemaker, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 121-40.
The most recent version of my view of ethics without desert and obligation, which features a forward-looking conception of moral responsibility and moral address.
“Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism,”Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8, 2017, pp. 259-65.
“Responsibility, Agency, and the Disappearing Agent Objection,”Le Libre-Arbitre, approches contemporaines, Jean-Baptiste Guillon (ed.), Paris, Collège de France, 2017.
This paper responds to challenges to the disappearing agent argument (against event-causal libertarianism) by Randy Clarke and Al Mele, and updates the argument in accord with this response.
“A Defense of Free Will Skepticism:Replies to Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 11, 2017, pp. 617-36.
My views on treatment of criminals, the manipulation argument against compatibilism, and the disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.
A review article on the relationship between love and free will, which focuses on whether love requires free will.
“Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” Neuroethics, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9382-7
This article sets out the most recent version of my non-retributivist view on treatment of criminals. In past versions I’ve emphasized the quarantine analogy for incapacitation and rehabilitation. Here I focus on general deterrence, arguing that besides the “free” general deterrence secured by publicizing incapacitation justified on the basis of the right to self-defense and defense of others, limited additional general deterrence can be justified on other grounds.
“Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection:: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes,”Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2019,doi = 10.1007_s11572-018-09487-0.
“Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta-Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2019, forthcoming.
This paper summarizes the non-mysterious Russellian physicalism I’ve proposed, which requires a measure of illusionism. The Illusion meta-problem motivates an explanation of our resistance to illusionism, and the one I offer invokes the apparent lack of ways of checking introspective representations for inaccuracy, and the apparent fact that any illusion of phenomenal consciousness itself would be phenomenally conscious.
of Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, Ethics 111, 2000, p. 426.
of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 2007, pp. 269-72.
of John Martin Fischer, My Way, Ethics 117, 2007, pp. 754-57.
of William Rowe, Can God Be Free?, The Philosophical Review 118, 2009, pp. 121-22.
of Ishtiyaque Haji,Reason’s Debt to Freedom, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, March 2013.
of Steven Horst, Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Metascience, March 2014 (link to penultimate draft), DOI: 10.1007/s11016-014-9877-8 (link to Metascience).
with Leigh Vicens, of Kevin Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, April 2015.
of Alfred Mele, Aspects of Agency,Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, June 2018.